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INTRODUCTION 
Albert Camus once wrote that “all men’s misery stems from the fact that he 
does not know how to use a simple language.”1  Even though legal language is 
seen as an “instrument of social control and social intercourse,”2 regrettably, this 
language is “highly technical” and, consequently, “incomprehensible to the 
layman.”3  It also promotes judicial indecisiveness.4 
A clear and demonstrable example of obfuscation in the language of law is 
found within the tort of negligence.  Indeed, it has been suggested that the 
negligence doctrine is sustained “more by its accommodating imprecision than 
by the clarity of its beacons.”5  Monochromatic colorings—tints, tones, and 
shades—subfuse this tort and are manifested vividly in the calculus of causation, 
which triggers the use of negligence as a legal cause of action.6  While defined 
previously as embodying the philosophical ideal of justice and the economic 
standard of efficiency,7 the theory of negligence was found—as early as 1980—
to be “losing . . . battles” because any effort at systematic analytical thinking 
“poorly reproduces the proper roles of social efficiency and justice in the 
analysis of tort cases.”8 
                                                 
 1. Robert Zaretsky, Moderate Rebel, T IMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 8, 2016, at 22 
(reviewing EDWARD J. HUGHES, ALBERT CAMUS (2015)) (quoting a letter from Albert Camus to 
Louis Guilloux). 
 2. Karl Olivercrone, Legal Language and Reality, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR 
OF ROSCOE POUND 151, 177 (Ralph A. Newman ed. 1962) [hereinafter ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE]. 
 3. Id. at  151. 
 4. MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN 
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 13 (2003). 
 5. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort 
Theory, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 34 (1980). 
 6. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF T ORT LAW 228–29 (1987). 
 7. Rodgers, supra note 5, at 2. 
 8. Inasmuch as there is a discernible drift  in the law of torts which imposes liability without 
any moral blame, some have asserted that the consequence of this position is that negligence is 
losing “ its character as a branch of faulty liability”—especially since this drift  results in requiring 
the “ innocent to pay for the damage they do.”  Because of this consequence, it  is urged “that 
negligence should therefore largely be jettisoned.”  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF T ORTS Ch. 13, § 75 (5th ed. 1984). 
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In order to rehabilitate the weakness of the tort of negligence, two models 
have, in the past, been suggested: “the rational decisionmaking model”9 and “the 
nontraditional decisionmaking model.”10  Under the first model, “when an 
injurer acts rationally strict liability should be imposed.”11  Alternatively, under 
the second model, when behavior is determined to be non-rational and “of 
psychological origin . . . [l]iability should be imposed . . . only for failure to meet 
a subjective ‘best efforts’ test”—because, this type of behavior must be judged 
“unsuited to a social cost-benefit analysis.”12  The foundational complication to 
this second analytical construct lies in the harsh reality that many—if, indeed, 
not most—social interactions are neither commenced nor completed in rational 
ways which can be predicted satisfactorily by economists.13  Human behavioral 
patterns are recognized as “nonrational . . . and the product of reflex, habit, or 
snap judgment.”14 
Today, concerns over the complexities of both applying and strengthening the 
tort of negligence remain.15  Since in America, it is estimated that 14% of the 
population—or, some 32,000,000 adults—cannot read at a basic level and thus 
are impaired cognitively,16 it is understandable that the “demise of the average, 
ordinary reasonable person” has been accepted and recorded.17  In a very real 
way, this statistical profile raises the question regarding the extent to which the 
                                                 
 9. Rodgers, supra note 5, at 2. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at  2. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at  6. 
 14. Id.  See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 20 (8th ed. 2011); 
RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF 
SOCIAL JUDGMENT xi (1980). 
 15. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness In and Out of Negligence Law, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2131, 2135–37 (2015) (discussing the complexities in tort law stemming from variations in 
the use of “ reasonableness”). 
 16. Illiteracy Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (July 22, 2017), 
http://www.statisticbrain.com/number-of-american-adults-who-cant-read/ (Aug. 22, 2016).  
Worldwide, it  is estimated 775,000,000 people cannot read.  Id.  Another source, the Program for 
the International Assessment of Adult Competencies, determined in 2013 that there were 
36,000,000 adults in the United States reading at a level below an average third grade level and 
that, for every six adults, one has low literacy skills.  OECD, T IME FOR THE U.S. TO RESKILL?: 
WHAT THE SURVEY OF ADULT SKILLS SAYS 12 (OECD Publishing, ed. 2013), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264204904-en. 
 17. George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical Revisionist 
Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 733 (1995); see also 
MORAN supra note 4, at 2. 
  Interestingly, the contemporary relevance of the notion of the average, ordinary person 
finds pertinence—it  is argued—when acts of autonomous computer tortfeasors come into play and 
these acts are tested by the traditional negligence paradigm where unreasonable conduct establishes 
liability.  Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liability, 86 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 5, 7 (2018). 
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judicial system should safeguard “economic well-being”18 for those members of 
society with cognitive impairment.  Given that a central ingredient of society’s 
very qualities of life is found within the notion of economic liberty,19 a strong 
argument can be made for protecting this special class of citizens.20  Either by 
statutory enactment or by judicial oversight and interpretation based on 
principles of equity, efforts can and should be undertaken to safeguard the 
economic well-being of citizens who are impaired cognitively.  With the demise 
of the notion of an average, ordinary, reasonable person—so central to 
establishing causation—the use and application of the tort of negligence is made 
even more cumbersome and, indeed, confounding.21 
This Article presents a third alternative—or what could be viewed as a new 
analytical construct and seen as an unintended consequence for legal advocacy 
and for judicial decision-making—to dealing with the ongoing vicissitudes of 
the tort of negligence and the uncertainties of its application: namely, greater 
reliance and utilization of the tort of nuisance through alternative pleading 
allowed under Rule 8(a)(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.22  
Utilizing Sections 822, 827, and 828 of The Restatement (Second) of Torts, 23 
this Article urges, specifically, a template—if not an effective construct—for 
determining when an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of 
property arises and is, thus seen, as a nuisance.24  No ablation of the tort of 
negligence is proposed.  Rather, merely, a greater policy recognition and shift 
from negligence as a controlling and all-dominating civil wrong to a more 
manageable one in the tort of nuisance, through reliance on a cost/benefit test 
for determining when conduct is unreasonable, and thus, actionable. 
While this policy shift, together with acceptance of the reality that the ideal of 
an average, ordinary, reasonable person—so essential to proving causation in 
negligence—is exceedingly problematic, if not indeed moribund,25 the judiciary 
must now assume wider oversight of cases where issues of cognitive capacity 
are in play.  When uneven bargaining positions are found to exist, particularly 
in predatory lending cases and contracts of adhesion, the courts must exercise 
their broad equitable powers under the doctrine of powers parens patriae in 
                                                 
 18. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). 
 19. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, 
RESTRAINT 473 (rev. & expanded 2d ed. 2008). 
 20. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the 
Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923, 923 (1993) 
(discussing the scope of protected classes created by statute). 
 21. MORAN, supra note 4, at 13.  See generally Abbott, supra note 17. 
 22. STEVEN BAILKER MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS HANDBOOK 358, 359, (2014). 
 23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS §§ 822, 827–828 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 24. See generally Smith, supra note 17. 
 25. See MORAN, supra note 4, at 13; see generally John Gardner, The Many Faces of the 
Reasonable Person, 131 L.Q. REV. 563 (2015). 
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order to protect the integrity of the contractual relationship, and thereby protect 
the economic well-being of the citizenry.26 
Part I of this Article lays the predicate for examining the symbiotic 
relationship of capitalism, economic efficiency, and the law.  This inter-
relationship is then explored and tested throughout the Article.  Part II considers 
challenges to reasonableness, the impact of heuristics on reasoned decision-
making and two flagrant examples of how the economic well-being of the 
cognitively impaired is affected by predatory lending practice and lax judicial 
oversight of structured settlements.  Part III evaluates the consequences of the 
“demise” of the average, ordinary, reasonable person through a careful study of 
the equitable powers of the judiciary to guide and “protect” the cognitively 
impaired not only through the parens patriae powers, but also by clear and 
sensible judicial decisions which validate the right of economic well-being for 
those impaired cognitively who seek corrective justice.  Part IV tackles the 
actual legal consequences of encountering ambiguities arising from the growing 
displacement and/or demise of the average, ordinary reasonable person theory, 
internalized in establishing causation in order to prove the tort of negligence.  
Part V suggests a policy for encouraging alternative pleading for negligence and 
nuisance and the use of the cost/benefit test for determining the reasonableness 
of conduct—as set out by The Restatement of Torts—as an effective way to 
bypass the complexities and uncertainties of proof which result from holding 
fast to the doctrine of causation, hobbled though it may be.  Part VI investigates 
a paradigmatic case of alternative pleading in order to test the strengths and 
weaknesses of pleading in this manner and concludes that this shift in policy—
from traditional normative standards of reasonable personhood to use of an 
economic cost/benefit template for determining when conduct is unreasonable—
will go far in achieving a more efficient and expeditious administration of 
justice.  This Article concludes by reaffirming the breadth and the power of the 
standard of reasonableness to strengthen the very goal of law: namely, to secure 
economic or corrective justice when an injurious abridgement of it occurs. 
I.  CAPITALISM, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, AND THE LAW 
First used as a word of art in 1854, capitalism still—today—is defined rarely, 
but used frequently.27  A working consensus of the word’s taxonomy, however, 
finds economists applying the word to issues of protection, consumption and 
distribution of market resources.28  Historians use a broader brush to define 
capitalism—approaching it as a socio-economic system emphasizing social 
                                                 
 26. George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or 
Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 907–911 (1976). 
 27. T HE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 195 (Joel Mokyr ed. 2003) 
available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195105070.001.0001/acr  
ef9780195105070?btog=chap&hide=true&pageSize=100&skipEditions=true&sort=titlesort&sou
rce=%2F10.1093%2Facref%2F9780195105070.001.0001%2Facref -9780195105070.2003). 
 28. Id. 
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groupings within the government and the interdependence of these groups with 
political and economic institutions.29 
The classical definition of capitalism is that it is “an economic system 
characterized by private or corporate ownership of capital goods by investments 
that are determined by private decisions, and by prices, production, and the 
distribution of goods that are determined mainly by competition in a free 
market.”30  Modernly, it has been suggested that the phrase, “age of betterment,” 
is preferable to “the age of capitalism” because of the alternative interpretations 
of the components of capitalism.31 
Although varying interpretations of the definition and the provenance of 
capitalism exist, what is more certain is that the Common Law is viewed 
properly “as a system for promoting economic efficiency.”32  The commitment 
to efficiency is strong yet is not seen as total.33  Indeed, there is an ever-present 
tension between efficiency and morality.34  This tension is more theoretical than 
real simply because the very principle “of law embodied in [both] the common 
law of England and of the United States[] is to correct injustices and thereby 
vindicate the moral sense.”35 
While there may be a discrepancy between “efficien[t] maximization and 
notions of the just distribution of wealth,”36 it is well to remember that in a 
market economy the roles for the law and for the government are “limited to 
controlling externalities and reducing transaction costs.”37  This is the extent to 
which economic efficiency requires.38  Inequalities in the distribution of income 
and wealth arise—and in turn generate substantial inequalities—because of the 
differences in not only the tastes and abilities of individuals, their levels of 
education and cognition, but also in their “luck.”39  It is submitted that those who 
live within the system of capitalism as capitalists may be expected to conduct 
themselves in an efficient way designed to maximize their wealth and, 
                                                 
 29. Id. 
 30. Capitalism , MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 183 (11th ed. 2003). 
 31. DEIDRE NANSEN MCCLOSKEY, BOURGEOIS EQUALITY: HOW IDEAS, NOT CAPITAL OR 
INSTITUTIONS, ENRICHED THE WORLD 94–100 (2016).  Differing views of the development of the 
economic history of capitalism are found at 94–100 and Chapter 12.  Id. 
 32. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 342; see also James Boyd White, Economics and Law: 
Two Cultures in Tension, 54 T ENN. L. REV. 161, 163 (1987) (discussing the origin of the 
“economic” view of the law). 
 33. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 344. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at  342. 
 36. Id. at  344. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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subsequently, happiness.40  Stated otherwise, the average person assuredly acts 
rationally so as to maximize self-interests.41  Money, which is but a natural 
product of human economy, is a medium through which a harmony of needs is 
achieved.42  It remains for the courts, then—as architects and gatekeepers of the 
standards of reasonableness—to, in their decision-making, strive to issue 
reasonable opinions that reflect the philosophy of a capitalistic society. 
II.  CHALLENGES TO REASONABLENESS 
Reasonable conduct and rational decision-making are expected of all in their 
day-to-day conduct.43  Indeed, economists have postured that, in order to 
maximize self-interest, the average person should act rationally.44  Rational 
actions include: full knowledge of risks, identification of options, and 
deliberative assessment of costs and benefits, together with a practice of 
calculated choices over time.45  Testing the extent to which conduct has failed 
to meet the standard of reasonableness and/or behavior is irrational is central to 
the judiciary’s duty to resolve conflicts and provide a level of corrective justice 
which is seen, hopefully, if not accepted, as sensible decision-making.  
Theoretically, at least, a capitalist shall be dedicated by a need to be rational as 
well as a coordinated need to maximize personal wealth. 
Reasonable is defined as “sensible” and equals or is synonymous with 
“rational.”46  One “endowed with . . . reason” is reasonable47 and “not 
irrational.”48  Rational is defined as “endowed with reason”49 and “having sound 
judgment,” being “sensible.”50  Sensible, finally, is defined as “easily 
understood,”51 “reasonable, judicious,”52 “proceeding from good sense.”53 
                                                 
 40. UNDERSTANDING HUMAN WELL-BEING 4–5 (Mark McGillivray & Matthew Clarke eds., 
2006); BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS: HOW THE ECONOMY AND 
INSTITUTIONS AFFECT WELL-BEING 75–76 (2002). 
 41. E. Donald Elliott , The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38, 
85 (1985).  Ideally, maximizing self-interest and advancing economic well-being promotes 
happiness for all and is the center goal of utilitarianism.  See Jedediah Purdy, Response, A Few 
Questions About the Social-Obligation Norm , 94 CORNELL L. REV. 949, 955 (2009). 
 42. Smith, supra note 17, at 677. 
 43. See Elliot, supra note 41, at 85–87. 
 44. Id. See also Smith, supra note 17, at 721. 
 45. VICTOR ALEXANDER T HOMPSON, DECISION THEORY, PURE AND APPLIED 3–16 (1971). 
 46. Reasonable, 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 291 (2d. ed. 1998). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. “A reasonable person” is rare.  Id. 
 49. Rational, 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 218(A) (2d. ed. 1998). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Sensible, 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 980–84 (2d ed. 1998). 
 52. Id. at  983 (14a). 
 53. Id. at  984 (14b). 
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A. Heuristics as an Impediment to Reasoned Decision Making 
Heuristics, termed “mental shortcuts,” are a common vector of force in 
cognitive analysis and often allow “good decisions” to be made.54  Yet when 
assessments of probabilities are inaccurate and “generalizations are wrenched 
out of context and treated as freestanding or universal principles,” a rational 
method for sound decision-making is lacking.55 
In moral and political decision-making, there is a ready reliance on “simple 
rules of thumb.”56  Indeed, “highly intuitive rules” form a foundation for much 
of a common sense course of action.57  Decisions may well fail, however, when 
biases are too dominate in these rules.58  Probabilities are very often assessed 
through reliance upon various heuristics—notably, probabilities.59  And, a 
probability is measured typically by “asking whether a readily available example 
comes to mind.”60 
B. Low Student Achievement in Secondary Education 
The Education Commission of the States has raised serious concerns that 
student achievement at the secondary level is decreasing significantly.61  
Nationally, an analysis of the Class of 2014 found that thirty-two states failed to 
require graduates take four years of English as well as Mathematics through 
Algebra II or its equivalent.62  Indeed, California, South Carolina, and Tennessee 
recently eliminated rules that required students pass final or exit exams in order 
to qualify for a diploma.63  Experts have found “[r]eading comprehension is a 
cognitive process that requires myriad skills and strategies.”64  Given these 
                                                 
 54. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 137 (2014).  
See also RALPH HERWIG ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS IN A SOCIAL WORLD VIII (2013). 
 55. SUNSTEIN, supra note 54, at 138. 
 56. Id. at  137. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at  137–38. 
 59. Id. at  155. 
 60. Id.  See also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of 
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 430, 430 (1972); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974). 
 61. Motoko Rich, Graduation Rates Rise, Experts Fear Diplomas Come Up Short, N.Y. 
T IMES, Dec. 26, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/us/as-graduation-rates-rise-experts-
fear-standards-have-fallen.html. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Lucy Hart, Cognitive Factors That Affect Reading Comprehension , SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, http://education.seattlepi.com/cognitive-factors-affect-reading-comprehension-
1591.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2017); see also Michael S. Roth, Why Johnny (Still) Can’t Read, 
T HE WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2017, 7:03 P.M., https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-johnny-still-cant-
read-1484093037 (concluding that teaching children how to read has become problematic because 
two-thirds of children score at low levels of competency, which, in turn, not only impairs literacy, 
but also compromises cognitive development or the ability to think, understand, and communicate); 
but see Richard L. Cupp, Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal 
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statistics, it is relatively easy to predict the burdensome societal challenges 
facing the Nation ahead when more and more of its citizens are incapable of 
being informed and educated sufficient to allow them to function in the market 
place and not only understand the laws and regulations there, but also in other 
social exchanges: the ability to make rational choices will be limited severely.65 
Cognitive limitations inhibit the ability to make rational choices.66  Being 
rational endows one with “the faculty of reasoning,”67 and the ability to make 
reasonable, sound, sensible judgments.68  For economists, rationality is tested 
objectively, not subjectively.69  The foundational assumption that human 
behavior is rational, however, seems contradicted by the “systemic departures 
from rationality”70 found in everyday life experiences.71 
C. Payday Loans 
An associated issue with safeguarding the economic well-being of cognitively 
impaired individuals can be seen with the practice of “payday loans.”72  This 
predatory lending practice allows money to be borrowed against paychecks, 
typically with a provision that the borrowed sums are paid back within a short 
                                                 
Personhood, 69 FLA. L. REV. 465, 502 (2017) (stating that assertions of this nature are an 
inappropriate reason for abridging or withholding rights of autonomous decision-making and 
concluding that cognitive capacity should be but one factor in asserting the extent to which such 
impairments compromise the “dignity interests” of such individuals as “a part of the human 
community”). 
 65. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND 
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 269–70 (1994) (arguing the existence of genetic, racial, and 
class differences with regard to intelligence); but see, T HE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE, 
INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 5 (Steven Fraser, ed. 1995) (arguing lack of 
documentation for the Herrnstein and Murray thesis regarding differences in I.Q. and concluding 
until equal educational opportunities for all races exist, there will be evil disparities here); see also 
PHILIP E. VERNON, INTELLIGENCE: HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT 128 (1979) (posturing that the 
gap between environmental and genetic effects on intelligence is much smaller than believed 
originally). 
  Thomas Sowell attacks what is termed the socio-economic theory of invincible fallacy.  
Under this fallacy, different outcomes between people of different races or sexes are held to result 
from discrimination.  Sowell asserts, however, that it  is because of differing interests and 
capabilities and backgrounds that differing outcomes occur.  This argument, thus, is in more in 
keeping with the idea of the environment, rather than genetic heritage, being determinative of 
cognitive development.  See generally T HOMAS SOWELL, DISCRIMINATION AND DISPARITIES 
(2018). 
 66. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 24. 
 67. Rational, 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 218 (2d ed. 1998). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 24. 
 70. Id. at  22. 
 71. Id. at  20. 
 72. See Mark Oppenheimer, Full Faith and Credit: Christians Unite Against Predatory 
Lending, N.Y. T IMES, June 10, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/11/us/full-faith-and-
credit-christian-groups-unite-against-predatory-lending.html. 
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period of time—normally two weeks.73  Payday offices are normally located 
near the working poor.74  Interestingly, in Maryland, it is reported that there are 
more offices of this type “than Walmart, Starbucks and McDonald’s 
combined.”75  Payday loans are accompanied by high interest rates; for instance, 
in Missouri, the payday loan’s annual interest rate cap is “1,950 percent.”76  
Indeed, the average interest charge for payday loans is “450 percent A.P.R.”77 
These situations in both Maryland and Missouri show not only the need for 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to re-double its effort at pay lending 
reform designed to cap credit interest for everyone at possibly thirty-six 
percent,78 but also for the judiciary to cast a more watchful and supervisory eye 
in cases of this nature.  Interestingly, in July 2016, the Bureau did in fact propose 
regulations designed to prevent customers from falling into traps in high-cost 
loans.79  Lenders have—predictably—argued that the proposed regulations 
“would effectively wipe out the industry, hurting their customers.”80 
Another area of predatory practice, if not contracts of adhesion, can be seen 
in the issuance of credit cards.  In order to comprehend the conditions imposed 
upon the holders of credit cards, the reader must have, at minimum, an eleventh-
grade reading level.81  Yet, half of American adults have only a ninth-grade level 
or below reading skill.82 
Complicating credit card issuance further, is the fact that those contracts have 
nearly 5,000 words.83  Consequently, many applicants for a credit card merely 
                                                 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  Despite a prohibition on payday loans, as well as on all loans on amoun ts of money 
under $250,000.00 carrying an interest rate above 16%, in the State of New York, online payday 
loans have nonetheless been made, forcing a new investigation by the Attorney General into the 
industry itself and the marketers participating in it .  See New York Expands Payday Lending 
Industry Investigation to Focus on Marketers, KLEIN MOYNIHAN T URCO, 
http://www.kleinmoynihan.com/new-york-expands-payday-lending-industry-investigation-to-
focus-on-marketers/ (last visited February 19, 2017). 
 78. See Oppenheimer, supra note 72. 
 79. Payday, Vehicle T itle, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 47864-01 
(July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 1041). 
 80. Joseph Lawler, Professor brings another take on payday lending , WASH. EXAMINER, Jan. 
16, 2017, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/professor-brings-another-take-on-paydaylending/ 
article/2611612; see also LISA SERVON, T HE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE 
CLASS SURVIVES 79 (2017) (suggesting that because 20% of Americans are “underbanked” and 
surely, have no bank account, payday loans can be readily obtained more expeditiously than 
processed through large retail banks). 
 81. Study: Credit Card Agreements Unreadable to Most Americans, CREDITCARDS.COM, 
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/unreadable-card-agreements-study.php (last updated 
Sept. 16, 2016). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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“skim through” the provisions of the contract itself.84  In fact, it is estimated that 
75% of Americans do not even read contracts for their credit card.85  Regrettably, 
financial illiteracy is significant and widespread among the general population.86 
D. Opportunities for Quick Cash 
A CBS television news report on April 20, 2016, by journalist Anna Werner, 
presented a sad report on the life of thirty-one year old Crystal Linton of 
Baltimore, Maryland—a functional illiterate suffering from irreparable brain 
damage who was not protected sufficiently by the legal system in managing a 
structured settlement of $630,000.00 that she received from lead poisoning she 
suffered at age three.87  As a consequence of an action, Crystal and her family 
recovered damages from two landlords for the poisoning and a structured 
settlement was executed.88  Under the provisions of the settlement, Crystal was 
guaranteed monthly payments for forty years.89  Subsequently, various loan 
companies, including the Stone Street Capital Company in Bethesda, Maryland, 
offered Crystal an opportunity to receive “quick cash.”90  Consequently, she 
liquidated her “payment stream,” valued at $408,000.00 for the sum of 
$66,000.00—with the Stone Street Company being the principal recipient.91  
Furthermore, CBS found that some two-dozen other victims of lead poisoning 
in Baltimore had made similar deals with other loan companies.92  The 
conclusion to this report found Crystal penniless and almost certainly facing 
homelessness.93 
No doubt in very large measure because of this news report by Anna Werner, 
in addition to a protracted seven-month investigation, on May 10, 2016, the 
Maryland Attorney General announced that the State was bringing suit against 
several finance companies for “tricking victims of lead paint poisoning into 
signing over the bulk of their settlements in exchange for a one-time cash 
                                                 
 84. Jericka Duncan, Reading the Fine Print: Why Credit Card Agreements are so Hard to 
Understand, CBS NEWS (Sept. 8, 2016, 7:10 P.M.), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-credit -
card-agreements-are-so-hard-to-understand/. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Justine S. Hastings, Brigitte C. Madrian & William L. Skimmyhorn, Financial Literacy, 
Financial Education and Economic Outcomes, 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 18412, 2012), published in 5 ANN. REV. ECON. 347 (2013). 
 87. Anna Werner, Lead poisoning victims possibly targeted to sign over settlement funds, 
CBS NEWS (April 20, 2016, 7:10 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lead-poisoning-victim s-
possibly-targeted-to-sign-over-settlement-money/. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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payment.”94  Simply put, cognitive impairment prevented Crystal Linton and 
similarly impaired individuals from understanding what the financial 
consequences of their actions would be in selling their structured settlements.  
III.  EQUITY AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
Aristotle’s concept of “corrective justice” gave rise to the idea of the rule of 
law as the bulwark of democratic societies.95  Seen as grounded in economics, 
this concept of justice is admittedly highly abstract.96  Corrective Justice “seeks 
to redress a preexisting equilibrium” or departure from it, “caused by the 
wrongful act.”97  Accordingly, the Aristotelian argument asserts that when 
“wrongful behavior . . . disturbs the preexisting balance of wealth or other 
advantages between” two parties—with one sustaining injury because of this 
behavior, the injured party “is entitled to some form of redress  that will, to the 
extent feasible, restores that preexisting balance . . . .”98  Determining not only 
when behavior is, thus, unreasonable and injurious, as well as assessing factors 
necessary to sustain a point of equilibrium in the required balancing is 
problematic.  While the Restatement of Torts’ model construct for determining 
when conduct is unreasonable and actionable under the tort of nuisance is 
significant,99 the law of equity fortifies the efficacy and strength of the 
Restatement. 
Although equity, in its original jurisdiction, protected “only property rights or 
rights of substance in the nature of property rights and [did] not protect personal 
or individual rights,”100 the modern trend extends equitable relief to protect those 
rights termed “personal” and recognized as such by the judiciary.101  Put simply, 
then, equity is understood popularly as signifying “natural justice or whatever is 
right and just as between man and man . . . .”102 
Some fifteen maxims, although not recognized as binding rules, are seen as 
principles underlying various specific rules.103  Three particular maxims would 
surely be in play when cases of predatory lending, for example, arise: “Equity 
will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy[;]”104 “He who comes to Equity 
                                                 
 94. Anna Werner, Maryland A.G. Says Company Targeted Lead Poisoning Victims, CBS 
NEWS, (May 10, 2016, 7:04 P.M.) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/maryland-attorney-general-
sues-finance-company-accused-of-targeting-lead-poisoning-victims/. 
 95. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 338. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 821B (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 100. WILLIAM Q. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK ON MODERN EQUITY 10 (2d ed. 1956). 
 101. Id. at  124. 
 102. Id. at  1. 
 103. RICHARD EDWARDS & NIGEL STOCKWELL, T RUSTS AND EQUITY 34–48 (7th ed. 2005). 
 104. Id. at  42. 
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must come with clean hands[;]”105 and, “Equity delights to do justice and not by 
halves[.]”106 
A. The United States Supreme Court’s Position 
In a key case in the U.S. Supreme Court in 1999, Grupo Mexicano De 
Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund,107 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued 
forcefully that modern equity should be analyzed and viewed expansively in 
order to ensure that justice is done when disputations between parties arise. 108  
The “Founders,” she said, “adopted equitable principles rather than equitable 
practices, leaving room for evolution and expansion of equitable remedies.”109  
Justice Scalia, however, expressed a cautionary view that unbounded dangers of 
equity existed if this expansive position were to be adopted.110  For him, it 
remained for Congress to expand, if necessary, the jurisdictional base of equity, 
thereby responding to changed circumstances.111 
It is argued for the cognitively impaired that the courts should exercise 
equitable supervisory powers in order to protect them from unfair and unjust 
conduct by those who deal with them.  These powers can be seen as emanating 
from the very notion of social contract. 
B. Judicial Paternalism or Equitable Supervision 
The notion of a social contract existing between the citizen and the 
government was envisioned by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1762 in France and 
adopted subsequently by the American Constitutional Convention.112  As such, 
the contract was viewed as the very foundation for legitimizing and for 
governing the common good.113  Citizen protection was then, and is today, the 
                                                 
 105. Id. at  43. 
 106. See HANBURY & MARTIN: MODERN EQUITY (Jamie Glister & James Lee eds., 20th ed. 
2015). 
 107. 527 U.S. 308 (1999). 
 108. Id. at  336 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting in part). 
 109. James Fullmer, The Outer Limits of Equity: A Proposal for Cautious Expansion, 39 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 557, 558 (2016) (cit ing Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo , 527 U.S. at 
336). 
 110. Grupo Mexicano De Desarollo , 527 U.S. at 332. 
 111. Fullmer, supra note 109, at 558–59, 566 (suggesting that three types of remedies be 
recognized: legal, core equity, and peripheral equity); José Brutau, Juridical Evolution and Equity, 
in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 82.  But see Fullmer, supra note 109, at 560–61, 
566 (looking to Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015) as evidence of a progressive 
expansionist “equitable mood”—termed “peripheral” by the author). 
 112. See generally ALFRED COBBAN, ROUSSEAU AND THE MODERN STATE (1964) (providing 
a history of Rousseau’s theories). 
 113. See generally George P. Smith, II & Richard P. Gallena, Re-Negotiating A Theory of 
Social Contract for Universal Health Care in America or, Securing the Regulatory State? , 63 
CATH. U. L. REV. 423, 431 (2014). 
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goal of the contract.114  The supervision and enforcement of “[f]air terms of co-
operation” are essential to the effective success of the theory and the ideal of an 
enforceable social contract.115  Implementation of this also requires “an 
informed and strategically focused citizenry.”116 
Inasmuch as it has been shown in this Article that cognitive impairment is 
now commonplace among Americans,117 and, as a direct consequence of this, 
the average, ordinary reasonable person is no longer just moribund, but is 
actually dead,118 a strong argument is to be made that the judiciary has an 
important role to play in securing the integrity of the notion of an enforceable 
social contract.  Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to promote the 
efficient administration of justice by construing challenges and conflicts which 
arise—and specifically with cases of predatory lending119 and contracts of 
adhesion120 by fully exercising their equitable powers to protect the cognitively 
impaired.  The well-established equitable remedy of reformation should be an 
important tool here, for, it seeks to correct a defective contract that does not 
reflect accurately the parties’ understanding of the contractual terms and ensures 
fairness.121 
Courts should seek to act in the best (business-economic) interest of 
cognitively deficient parties.122  Substantive judgments should be made 
judicially, based upon what is the fairest economical position for the injured 
party—a judgment that, in essence, would have been made initially when 
entering into a contractual relationship or other legal relationship if the party did 
not have diminished cognitive capacity.123  These judicial “interferences” are 
justified in order to manage and protect against economic harm or negative 
externalities, both at the micro and the macro levels of society. 
                                                 
 114. Id. at  424–25, 432. 
 115. Id. at  432. 
 116. Id. at  n.53. 
 117. See supra notes 16, 61–65, 84–85. 
 118. See generally MORAN, supra note 4, at 16, 315 (claiming that radical changes in the 
concept of what is reasonable is required for there to be an objective standard).  
 119. See supra Section II.C. 
 120. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction , 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1173, 1177 (1983) (outlining seven characteristics defining a contract of adhesion).  The bulk of 
contracts executed in the United States are adhesive; see 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27A (rev. 
ed. 2018). 
 121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  See also 5 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.18 (2017); Thomas E. Baynes, Jr., More Than You Wanted to Know 
About the Doctrine of Reformation , 78 FLA. BAR. J. 55, 58 (Oct. 2004). 
 122. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 19, at 49–50. 
 123. Id.  Interestingly, both the best interests and the substituted judgment constructs are used 
extensively in bioethical and healthcare decision-making cases.  JANET DOLGIN & LOIS L. 
SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS & THE LAW 72–74 (2015). 
2018]Re-Evaluating the Demise of the Average, Ordinary, Reasonable Person  713 
C. The Role of Parens Patriae 
Although based originally on the state’s right of guardianship of common 
resources, the doctrine of parens patriae has extended the very scope of 
sovereign interest to the general welfare of its citizens to act paternally.124  
Despite cognitive impairments, daily life decisions must, nonetheless, be 
made.125  In order to make informed decisions, however, information sources—
business, economic, scientific—must be utilized by the average citizen.  Without 
knowledge or cognitive capacity (e.g., intelligence) sufficient to access and 
process full and accurate information, about costs and benefits of their decisions, 
actions may be taken which run counter to the best economic and social interest 
of these decisionmakers.126  Consequently, “[p]ersons who have insufficient 
understanding to make informed choices, to deliberate, and to act according to 
their . . . plans have diminished autonomy,”127 and must—to the extent 
practical—be protected by the judicial system. 
It is fully consistent with the states’ parens patriae powers that it seeks to 
protect incompetent or economically at-risk persons who are unable to care for 
themselves in the marketplace.128  These powers are shaped, often in 
“individualized context.”129  It remains for the state, then—in exercising these 
powers—to act beneficently, and “to safeguard the general community interest 
in health, welfare, and economic benefit.”130 
The need for a positive judicial stance here is all the more important given the 
reality that a legislative response through amendment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 is not achievable presently.131  This law, and other similar pieces of 
legislatively enacted safeguards have attempted—with varying degrees of 
                                                 
 124. Curtis, supra note 26, at 908. 
 125. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 19, at 51. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at  49. 
 128. Id. at  95–98.  See generally SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING 
COERCIVE PATERNALISM (2013) (arguing that state interference in individual autonomy should be 
the ideal standard). 
 129. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 19, at 96. 
 130. Id. at  98.  While liberal principles of pluralism stress the need for government to remain 
neutral and allow individuals the autonomous freedom to establish their own life priorities, there is 
also a recognition that those “with intellectual disabilities” may have diminished levels of 
intellectual capacity to govern their own affairs, thereby bringing into play their competency to 
make rational decisions, especially in the market place.  It  is argued that “decisions about 
competency need to be made, whenever possible, through a formal legal process characterized by 
impartiality and fundamental fairness.”  Id. at  45. 
 131. See generally Ted Barrett , Congress is Back, and Here’s What’s on the Agenda , CNN 
(Jan. 2, 2018, 12:31 P.M.), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/02/politics/congress-republicans-2018-
agenda-return/index.html (discussing the 2018 congressional agenda, but not naming civil rights as 
a priority).  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 protected “race, color, religion, sex [and] national origin.” 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 241 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17 (2012)).  
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success—to rid the country of various forms of discrimination, thereby allowing 
all citizens equal opportunities regardless of specific limiting conditions.132 
The protective classes within Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act133 were 
established to “achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove 
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an indefinable group of white 
employees over other employees.”134  Presently, Congress has expanded the 
original four protected classes in the 1964 Act to include twelve protected 
classes.135 
D. Judicial Validation of the Ethics of Efficiency 
Sensible judicial decision-making owes its success to what may be termed, 
“an intuitive sense of justice.”136  While this approach has led to “sensible results 
. . . there has been no similar pressure [for the judiciary] to produce sensible 
explanations.”137  Judges must guard against “subtle distortions of prejudice and 
bias.”138  Legal disputes are resolved judicially by reference to “normative 
standards that enjoy sufficient resonance in the communities in which they are 
binding.”139  Whether denominated as “legal doctrine” or based upon an 
“educated situation-sense,” their legitimacy and viability depend upon more than 
recognition that legal doctrine licenses or validates them.140 
Although economic norms—and particularly those of efficiency—are 
properly viewed as foundational vectors of force in both capitalistic democracies 
and societies, judicial “sensitivity to political and social norms” has also played 
a significant role in judicial decision-making.141  Indeed, the judicial mind is 
                                                 
 132. See Rotunda, supra note 20, at 923–28; see also Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Supreme 
Court Chipping Away at Title VII: Strengthening It or Killing It? , 74 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1161–62 
(2014). 
 133. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 241 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17 (2012)). 
 134. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (“ If an employment practice 
which operates to exclude [African-Americans] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, 
the practice is prohibited”).  When considering a suit  regarding protected classes, the party bringing 
the suit  has the burden of proving a discriminatory intent or motive.  See Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 986. (1988).  In facilitating this requirement, the Supreme Court devised 
a burden-shifting framework.  Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255–56 
(1981). 
 135. The twelve protected classes are: (1) Race, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); (2) Color, id.; (3) 
Religion, id.; (4) National Origin, id.; (5) Sex, id.; (6) Pregnancy, id.; see also § 2000e (including 
pregnancy in the definition of “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex”); (7) Familial Status, § 
3605(a); (8) Disability, § 12112; (9) Genetic Information, § 2000ff -1; (10) Age, 29 U.S.C. § 
623(e)(2); (11) Citizenship, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b; and (12) Veteran Status, 38 U.S.C. § 4311. 
 136. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, T HE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE ix (1991). 
 137. Id. 
 138. JOHN RAWLS, A T HEORY OF JUSTICE 207 (rev. ed.1999). 
 139. Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1975, 1983 (2015). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  For a collection of empirical studies exploring economic factors in judicial decision - 
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enriched not only by “emotion,” but by “temperament,” “experience,” and 
“background” together with “ideology” and an “objective understanding” of the 
law of the case.142 
In crafting their judicial decisions, it is important for judges to be “realistic” 
and practical in their analysis.143  The primary need remains to write a sensible 
opinion which would allow an “intelligent” layperson to review it as being 
correct.144  To that end, exhibiting “common sense” goes far to make sound 
law.145  Reasoned or reflective judgments are far better than making decision 
grounded in personal judgment.146 
For Benjamin Cardozo, finding a “just decision” or “solution” is pivotal to 
sound judicial decision-making.147  The judicial responsibilities of the judiciary, 
then, are very much the same as they have been over the years: namely, to craft 
decisions which are drawn from common sense, and thus reflect “sensible 
results[;]” decisions which are reasoned carefully and are reflective; and 
decisions which are “just.”  Judicial philosophies should be clear and un-
ambiguous and not seen as “mysteries.”148 
In a contemporary society where capitalism is the cornerstone, it is incumbent 
upon the judiciary to protect and sustain economic liberties.  Indeed, this very 
ideal is central to the Federal Constitution and its interpretation.149  Furthermore, 
this notion is fortified when it is realized that the core of every legal case tests 
the propriety, or reasonableness, of the parties’ conduct.  In reaching a decision 
on this very issue, then it is submitted that the courts should use the template 
suggested in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Nuisance, for determining the 
                                                 
making, see LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES, & RICHARD A. POSNER, T HE BEHAVIOR OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES: A T HEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013). 
 142. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES T HINK 174 (2008).  Nine theories of judicial behavior 
are said to be: attitudinal; strategic; sociological; psychological; economic; organization; 
pragmatic; phenomenological; and legalistic.  Id. at  19. 
 143. See RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 167–68 (2013). 
 144. See id. at  268. 
 145. Peak v. United States, 353 U.S. 43, 46 (1957). 
 146. See John Dewey, Logical Method in Law, 10 CORN. L. REV. 17, 24 (1924). 
 147. Robert John Araujo, Justice As Right Relationship: A Philosophical and Theological 
Reflection on Affirmative Action , 27 PEPP . L. REV. 377, 404 (2000).  Cardozo listed four methods 
which could be used in determining the “ justest” and “ rightest” decision: the logical or 
philosophical method; a consideration of historical antecedents relevant to the instant case; 
reference to prevailing social usages and customs; and sociological analysis of the face of a case.  
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, T HE NATURE OF T HE JUDICIAL PROCESS 30–31 (1921). 
 148. Edwin W. Patterson, reviewing Julius Stone, T HE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW: 
LAW AS LOGIC, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1946), 47 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 331 (1947).  
See generally Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 T EX. L. REV. 257–58 (2015). 
 149. See GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 19, at 473 (“The Framers intended to defend economic 
freedoms, as evidenced by several constitutional provisions.  Notably, the Constitution prevents the 
state from depriving persons of property (or life or liberty) without due process of law (economic 
due process), from impairing the obligations of contracts (freedom of contract), and from taking 
private property for public use without just compensation (“ takings”).”) (footnotes omitted). 
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reasonableness of conduct.150  The cost/benefit construct of the Restatement 
fortifies the economic ethic and rationale of efficiency which should be the 
standard used in deciding all cases where reasonable conduct is in issue. 
IV.  CAUSATION: NEMESIS OF THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE 
Most areas of law use reasonableness as either a “yardstick” for measuring 
conduct or understand it as an “overreaching legal concept” and, as such, 
“applicable mutatis mutandis.”151  As observed, the fundamental “objective of 
tort liability” is the “deterrence of unreasonable risk.”152  Accordingly, the 
determination of when risks are unreasonable is central to any fair application 
and use of the law of negligence.153  The “essence of reasonableness” continues 
to bedevil the courts, with agreement upon one definition remaining a “logical 
impossibility.”154  Normative definitions, which allow for concrete ethical 
theories (e.g., consequentialist, deontological, or virtue), are however said to be 
preferable to positive definitions of reasonableness.155  Alternatively, because 
the attributes of determining a reasonable character are so “illusory,” it has been 
suggested that the whole ideal or notion of determining whether conduct is 
reasonable or unreasonable be re-calibrated so that the determinative issue is 
whether a particular conduct is grounded in common sense.156  In testing the 
contours of the integrity or rationality of common sense responses, “the quality 
of the normative choice that particular interactions reveal” should be 
determinative.157  Consequently, what is taken as “normal” should be accepted, 
then, as reasonable.158 
Others maintain a more realistic approach to resolving the quandary of 
measuring reasonable conduct is found through the utilization of community 
standards as an analogy to the reasonable person.159  Therefore, courts should 
determine whether the questioned conduct reflects “the average conscience of 
the time” and, thus, should “be subject[ed] to the social sense of what is right.”160  
                                                 
 150. See generally POSNER, supra note 143. 
 151. Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 391–92 
(2012); see also ERNEST J. WEINRIB, T HE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 147–49 (1995) (discussing 
reasonable care). 
 152. See Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 328. 
 153. See id. at  331. 
 154. Id. at  391. 
 155. Id. 
 156. MORAN, supra note 4, at 316; see also, Smith, supra note 17, at 733.  Confusing efforts 
have been made to distinguish “practical reasonableness” (classified further as “ instrumental 
rationality”) and “practical reason and practical judgment ” from economic rationality.  See 
Zipursky, supra note 15, at 2142. 
 157. MORAN, supra note 4, at 316. 
 158. Id. at  131. 
 159. Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 391–92. 
 160. United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). 
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Judge Learned Hand first suggested this approach in 1913,161 and it was used as 
a judicial “formula” for adjudicating obscenity cases, specifically, in defining 
when conduct was obscene.162  Over the years, Judge Hand clarified and refined 
his definition of reasonableness for negligence cases in terms of cost/benefit 
analysis.163  Accordingly, Judge Hand’s economic definition “holds that a person 
acts unreasonably if he or she takes less than the socially optimal level of 
care.”164  Therefore, for those who fail to take “cost-justified precautions,” under 
the Hand construct a claim of negligence is proper.165 
Some have modified the Hand Formula so as to include a causation element,  
thereby supporting a balancing theory and driving economic efficiencies.166  
Others have criticized these efforts and contended that they essentially sound the 
                                                 
 161. See id. 
 162. Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 392. 
 163. Id. at  398.  See also Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949); United States v. 
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LAW INST. 2010).  The three variables in the Hand formula are then listed as t he primary factors to 
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“Negligence” is the omission to do something which a reasonable person guided by those 
considerations which ordinarily influence a person of reasonable prudence would do 
under all the circumstances of the situation in question, or the doing of something which 
a person of the ordinary reasonable prudence would not do under all the circumstances 
of the situation in question. 
George P. Smith, II, Effective Instructions to the Federal Jury in a Civil Case: A Consideration in 
Microcosm , 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 576 (1967) (Appendix A, Model Pattern Jury Instructions). 
 166. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 234 (advocating for a “refined version of the 
Hand formula” with a causation element); see also Zipursky, supra note 15, at 2151 (explaining 
Posner’s theory of negligence is the “classic interpretation of the negligence standard as an 
economic version of the Hand Formula”). 
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death knell altogether for the Formula.167  The argument for this stance is that 
these economic revisions theories “not only fail to explain the existence and 
prominence of the actual causation requirement, but also make it increasingly 
clear that the requirement is—as first suggested by Calabresi—incompatible 
with wealth maximization.”168 
Previously, as early as 1980, the Formula was seen as focused narrowly on a 
single claim in court, rather than as analyzing the defendant’s actions in the 
aggregate.169  Arguing in 2015 that “the Hand formula grossly misrepresents 
what ‘negligence’ really is,”170  Zipursky asserts that the Formula has lost 
relevance because of its failure to recognize the “moral principle that each of us 
owes a duty of ordinary care to others, and that liability in negligence is premised 
on a failure to live up to that duty.”171 
Failing to meet a standard of reasonable care is the gravamen of the tort of 
negligence.172  Consequently, when a party creates a risk which a reasonable 
person would not impose upon others, the standard of reasonable care is 
breached.173  “Presupposed is the existence of a certain level of risk to which the 
defendant can expose the plaintiff without committing a wrong, even if injury 
should result.”174  Liability, therefore, is imposed upon a defendant only when 
injuries materialize from risk conduct which exceeds that level.175  Under the 
Common Law, a determination is made on a case-by-case basis as to the 
acceptability of risk.176  The American position utilizes a comparison of the risk 
with precautionary costs necessary to prevent it.  Interestingly, the English and 
Commonwealth position is to disregard the costs of prevention altogether in 
                                                 
 167. See generally Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane 
of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 438–55 (1985) (criticizing economic theories of 
analyses, such as those suggested by Calabasi, Shavel, Landes, and Posner).  
 168. Id. at  439. 
 169. Rodgers, supra note 5, at 9 (explaining that the “[s]ingle case applications of the Hand 
Formula understate the social costs of the private investment decision by overlooking all other 
accidents that could be avoided by the same safety expenditures”).  Several years later, Landes and 
Posner sought to refute this point writing specifically, “ [t]he first  of those factors is the probability 
of not injuring a particular person but any person . . . .  This point is overlooked in the attack on the 
economic approach to negligence . . . .”  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 151 n.6. 
 170. Zipursky, supra note 15, at 2134. 
 171. Id. at  2169. 
 172. WEINRIB, supra, note 151, at 147.  The traditional test for determining whether the tort of 
negligence has been committed is tied to the reasonable person test.  Accordingly, negligence 
occurs whether action is undertaken, which under the circumstances, a reasonable per son would 
not have undertaken; or, “ from failing to do an act that a reasonable person would do.”  Miller & 
Perry, supra note 151, at 325. 
 173. WEINRIB, supra, note 151, at 147.  Seen as a “decision-guiding device” for judges and 
jurors alike, the reasonable person test allows these decision makers “ to make reasonableness 
determinations where necessary.”  Zipursky, supra note 15, at 2149. 
 174. WEINRIB, supra, note 151, at 147. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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determining whether negligence has been committed.177  Focus, instead, is 
placed upon determining whether a defendant has met its responsibility to meet 
a standard of care which is owed to a putative plaintiff.178 
The concept of proximate cause, as seen, is fraught with ambiguity and 
difficulty in articulating this essentially because the term seeks to convey those 
legal circumstances where it is fair to impose liability for negligent 
wrongdoing.179  Under any and all tests of proximate cause, the underlying 
purpose is the same: namely, “to limit the defendant’s liability for policy 
reasons . . . .”180  Accordingly, the judiciary has considerable “leeway to dismiss 
lawsuits in cases where the judge is simply not comfortable with the idea of 
assigning blame to the defendant.”181  Yet, when an economic analysis of tort 
law is followed, the very notion of causation can be dispensed with largely.182  
The reason for this is that since both plaintiff and defendant may have taken 
precautions in order to avoid conflict, the central task is more properly not to 
determine whether a defendant caused an injury to the plaintiff, but rather which 
of the parties—acting more “cheaply” or economically—could have avoided the 
accident altogether.183 
V.  NUISANCE LAW AND THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES AND NEW PROSPECTS FOR THE EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE 
Even though termed an “impenetrable jungle,”184 the Common Law tort of 
nuisance must surely be recognized, at a minimum, as ubiquitous.185  It is 
through the very ubiquity of the Common Law that the law of nuisance has 
shown its “historical capacity to adapt to . . . changing conditions . . . .”186  By 
statute, California finds: 
                                                 
 177. Id. at  147–48. 
 178. Id. at  148.  “ [H]arm is universally regarded as the [proximate cause] . . .  of the actor’s 
negligence.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 435, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 179. See GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 19, at 247.  See also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, 
at Ch. 8. 
 180. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra, note 19, at 251. 
 181. Id.  See generally, H. L. A. HART & T ONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959). 
 182. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 229.  See also WEINRIB, supra note 172, at 47–48. 
 183. Id. 
 184. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, T HE LAW OF T ORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971). 
 185. See generally Smith, supra note 17. 
 186. George P. Smith, II & David M. Steenburg, Environmental Hedonism Or, Securing The 
Environment Through The Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 65, 106 
(2015). 
  Public nuisance has been described as a “super tort”—this, because both the standards of 
fault and of causation are more pliable and, thus, are applied less rigorously than with claims of 
traditional negligence.  When used by governments as plaintiffs, the remedy of nuisance is a form 
of strict  no-fault liability.  See GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 19, at 245–46. 
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Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the 
illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the 
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere 
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully 
obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any 
navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public  
park, square, street, or highway is a nuisance.187 
Stated more succinctly, an unreasonable interference with the use or 
enjoyment of real property is a nuisance.188  In the law of nuisance, only when 
actions are shown to be unreasonable—rather than intentional—may, under the 
facts, they be classified as nuisance.189  Concern is not given to “the riskiness of 
the defendant’s conduct,” but, rather, whether the defendant’s conduct was an 
“interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s land.”190 
In determining when unreasonable conduct gives rise to legal liability, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Nuisance, Sections 822, 827, and 828 presents a 
template—if not a workable construct—for assessing the extent to which 
behavioral norms and economic value factors have been so compromised as to 
create a legal injury.  The Restatement factors, or vectors of force, provide a 
framework which, in turn, allows the judiciary to test the extent to which the 
parameters of legally acceptable (e.g., reasonable) conduct has been 
compromised.191 
Section 822 of the Restatement of Tort, Nuisance, provides: 
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his 
conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another’s interest in the 
private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either 
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or 
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling 
liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous 
conditions or activities.192 
In determining the gravity of the harm and the social value of activity 
allegedly causing injury, Sections 827 and 828 of the statement list a number of 
factors to be considered as: 
(a) The extent of the harm involved; 
(b) the character of the harm involved; 
                                                 
 187. Cal. Civil Code § 3479 (2012). 
 188. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 42.  See Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conf. Ass’n, 26 
A.3d 931, 939 (Md. 2011) (defining an interference as one which exceeds what a reasonable person 
can be expected to tolerate). 
 189. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 49. 
 190. WEINRIB, supra note 151, at 190.  See generally Smith, supra note 17. 
 191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS, §§ 822, 827, and 828 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 192. Id. § 822.  See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN, & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HANDBOOK ON 
T ORTS, Ch. 30, § 30.6 (2d ed. 2016). 
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(c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment 
invaded; 
(d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the 
character of the locality; and 
(e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.193 
The “Utility of Conduct” balancing factors are listed in Section 828 as: 
(a) the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the 
conduct; 
(b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and 
(c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion.194 
What is seen in Sections 827 and 828 of the Restatement, therefore, is nothing 
more than cost/benefit analysis of quintessential, or reasonable, conduct.  The 
advantage of the Restatement’s position here is that rather than being tethered to 
positive definitions of reasonableness as seen with caution in the tort of 
negligence, which are “logically unacceptable[,]”195 the Restatement seeks to 
determine, and thereby codify, the reasonable bounds of normative conduct (i.e., 
legally acceptable conduct) by enumerating specific behavioral and economic 
factors to test when challenged conduct is not cost-effective and thus 
unreasonable.196 
Interestingly, with terms such as “balancing the equities,” “comparative 
hardship,” “relative hardship,” and “the balance of consensus,” most state courts 
evaluate requests for injunctive relief for nuisance as some form of balancing 
mechanism.197 
A. Challenging the Balancing Test 
No doubt, the two major obstacles to the integrity of the balancing test for the 
Restatement are consistency and clarity—this, because, admittedly, there is no 
assurance, even theoretically, that like cases will be treated similarly.   
Subsequently, the effect of this reality is that uncertainty and lack of 
predictability exist regarding what standard of behavior is allowed and what is 
disallowed.198  Yet, in considering nuisance law and the principal remedy of 
equitable relief through use of the injunction, the balancing test should be seen 
                                                 
 193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) T ORTS § 822 (AM LAW INST. 1979). 
 194. Id. § 828. 
 195. Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 391. 
 196. The three options to the Restatement of Torts position are: making a determination under 
English Common Law that a defendant ’s conduct caused or threatened an invasion of land owned 
by a plaintiff; applying a community understanding of what is normal or abnormal uses of land; 
and, whether the complaining parties acted within the norms of “neighborliness” of the community 
in which they live.  See Smith & Steenburg, supra note 186, at 105 (citing T HOMAS W. MERRILL 
& HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 28–29 (2d ed. 2012)). 
 197. Jeff L. Lewin, The Silent Revolution in West Virginia’s Law of Nuisance, 92 W. VA. L. 
REV. 235, 304 (1990). 
 198. Smith, supra note 17, at 720. 
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as a positive—if not dominant strength—because of the modernizing values and 
vectors of force it exhibits by incorporating these contemporary social values 
into the test, itself.199 
B. Fortifying the Restatement through the Common Law 
The whole of the Common Law can be seen properly as both sustaining and 
fortifying the Restatement’s position on nuisance, for it is through the Common 
Law, and its capacity to adapt to the changing conditions of social conduct, that 
the most efficacious test of reasonableness can be found.200  Indeed, this capacity 
for adapting to the changing condition of each community, and the views and 
understanding of the communities regarding what “normal land use” include, 
and the extent to which they are violated by unreasonable conduct, are central to 
the over-arching power of the Common Law.201  The weight of the Restatement 
balancing factors for determining whether conduct is reasonable or tortious ( i.e., 
unreasonable) varies, then, within each community and with the community’s 
progress or failure to integrate public civil values into new and significant 
factors.202 
Adding to the guidance of the Common Law as a real and animated direction 
and force today are three important realities: the doctrine of waste,203 the 
principle of “Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,”204 and the acceptance that the 
Common Law is best viewed properly “as a system promoting economic 
efficiency.”205  Resource use is, ideally, guided by five values: economic 
efficiency; human flourishing; interpretational and future population groups; 
stability and consistency; and ecological balance.206  Ideally, any metric for 
determining when a resource use is unreasonable and wasteful should therefore 
balance these values or vectors of force.  This Article argues that economic 
efficiency should be pivotal to any determination of when a use—under the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts—is unreasonable, be it a nuisance or any other 
civil wrong. 
                                                 
 199. Id. 
 200. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY: NATURE LAW AND 
SOCIETY 57 (4th ed. 2010). 
 201. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as 
Land Use Controls, 40 CHI. L. REV. 681, 729–33 (1973).  See also Smith & Steenburg, supra note 
186, at 106. 
 202. PLATER ET AL., supra note 200, at 57. 
 203. Michael Pappas, Anti-Waste, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 741, 751, 756, 764 (2014).  See also Smith, 
supra note 17, at 696 n.262. 
 204. Id. at  680. 
 205. POSNER, supra note 14, at 342.  See also Elliot, supra note 41, at 71. 
 206. Pappas, supra note 203, at 741.  See generally George P. Smith, II & Griffin W. 
Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Economic Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARV. ENVT’L 
L. REV. 53 (1991). 
2018]Re-Evaluating the Demise of the Average, Ordinary, Reasonable Person  723 
The sic utere principle mandates that the use of real property not be injurious 
to others.207  Although seemingly open-ended, this principle lays the predicate 
for the Restatement’s balancing factors and thus “fleshes out” the action which 
result in unreasonable conduct.208  As argued, these balancing factors, in turn, 
provide a template for decision-making for all levels of the law and just not the 
tort of nuisance. 
Accepting the fact that the Common Law promotes economic efficiency209 
establishes the efficacy of the notion that members of contemporary capitalistic 
society should seek to maximize their wealth by acting in a rational, efficient 
manner.  This assumption, it is submitted, should be the controlling philosophy 
for the judiciary when challenges are made that conduct is not in conformance 
with this standard and is inefficient, unreasonable, and, thus, injurious.   
Reasonableness of conduct becomes the focal point of any judicial inquiry.  The 
construct or template for proving this conduct is, then, to be found, as seen, 
within the cost/benefit balancing interests set out by the Restatement of Torts, 
Nuisance. 
VI.  PLEADING IN THE ALTERNATIVE: A PARADIGM OF CONFUSION OR 
CLARIFICATION? 
The goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—through liberal 
construction of judicial pleadings—is to promote the efficient and expeditious 
administration of justice.210  A final judgment “must grant all relief to which a 
plaintiff is entitled, whether or not demanded in the pleadings.”211  Specific 
authorization is granted under Rule 8(d) for a statement of as many claims or 
defenses deemed necessary regardless of this characterization as legal, equitable, 
or maritime.212 
Alternative or hypothetical allegations, even if inconsistent, are allowed.213  
Accordingly, the pleader is neither required to elect among allegations put 
forward nor to elect remedies for relief.214  It is the responsibility of the trier of 
fact to consider both plaintiff’s claims and the defenses raised.215  The Federal 
Rules require only that the defendant be given “a short and plain statement of 
the claim” which provides fair notice of the claims and grounds being put 
forward by a plaintiff.216 
                                                 
 207. Smith & Steenburg, supra note 186, at 69. 
 208. Smith, supra note 17, at 698. 
 209. Id.  See also Smith & Steenburg, supra note 186, at 68–69. 
 210. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 467 (7th ed. 
2012). 
 211. Id. at  466. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at  470. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at  468. 
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A case study of Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC217 serves to illustrate both the 
positive and the negative consequences of pleading a nuisance action and one in 
negligence alternatively. 
A. Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC: The Facts 
The facts in Cline are straightforward.  Dr. Matthew W. Cline was driving 
home from his dental practice on the evening of April 17, 2008, near the seven 
hundred block of Rio Road East, in Albemarle County, Virginia.218  According 
to a Virginia Department of Transportation Daily Traffic Volume Estimate, 
twenty-five thousand vehicles drove on this portion of Rio Road East.219  One 
parcel of property adjacent to Rio Road East near its intersection with Pen Park 
Drive was “owned and/or controlled, inspected, maintained and/or serviced” by 
Dunlora South, LLC (“Dunlora”).220  As Dr. Cline drove his 1997 Ford Explorer 
home a large, dead or rotting, tree, approximately twenty-five inches in 
diameter, fell from the parcel of land owned by Dunlora onto the roof, 
windshield, and hood of his vehicle.221  Dr. Cline suffered severe and permanent 
injuries from the accident, including fractures of his cervical spine.222 
In modern tort law, many of the claims involving dead or rotting trees, such 
as the case in Cline, concern negligence and/or nuisance law.223  Virginia Courts 
                                                 
 217. 726 S.E.2d 14, 15–16 (Va. 2012). 
 218. Opening Brief of Appellant at 6, Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14 (Va. 2012) (No. 
110650), 2012 WL 6734517, at *5. 
 219. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15. 
 220. Opening Brief of Appellant at 6, Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14 (No. 110650). 
 221. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15; Opening Brief of Appellant at 6, Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14 (No. 
110650). 
 222. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15. 
 223. Daniel Bidwell, Of Trees, Vegetation, and Torts: Re-Conceptualizing Reasonable Land 
Use, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (2014); see George P. Smith, II, Re-validating the Doctrine 
of Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 VT. L. REV. 687, 687 (2005); Glenn A. McCleary, The Possessor’s 
Responsibilities As to Trees, 29 MO. L. REV. 159, 173 (1964); Lane v. W.J. Curry & Sons, 92 
S.W.3d 355 (Tenn. 2002) (discussing recent case law concerning tree-related harms in more urban 
settings); e.g., Townes at Grand Oaks Townhouse Ass’n, Inc. v. Baxter, 86 Va. Cir. 449 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. 2013) (finding no liability to a condominium owner in the absence of negligence of the 
homeowner association); Stackhouse v. Royce Realty & Mgmt. Corp., 970 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Il. 
App. 2012) (finding defendants property owner and management corporation equally responsible 
in negligence when a rotted tree fell and injured a pedestrian); Taylor v. Olsen, 578 P.2d 779, 784 
(Or. 1978) (finding no negligence on the part of a property owner when the rot of the center of the 
tree was not visible upon external inspection before the tree fell in a roadway, causing an accident); 
Hensley v. Montgomery Cty., 334 A.2d 542, 545 (Md. App. 1975) (finding no duty by the property 
owner or the county responsible for the road in a negligence claim when a tree limb from a dead 
tree fell through plaintiff’s windshield as he was driving). See also RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF 
T ORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An actor whose wrongful conduct 
harms or obstructs a public resource or public property is subject to liability for resulting economic 
loss if the claimant ’s losses are distinct in kind from those suffered by members of the affected 
community in general.”). 
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first addressed claims concerning dead or rotting trees in 1939.224  In Smith v. 
Holt, the Supreme Court of Virginia established the Virginia Rule, which creates 
a nuisance cause of action for an adjoining landowner if “a sensible injury has 
been inflicted by the protrusion of roots from a noxious tree or plant onto [his 
land.]”225  This duty follows the common law maximum “sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas—one must so use his own rights as not to infringe upon the 
rights of another.”226  Then, in Fancer v. Fagella the Virginia Supreme Court 
reexamined the Virginia Rule of negligence,227 and instead decided to adopt a 
rule similar to the Virginia Rule, called the Hawaii Rule.228  The Hawaii 
approach finds that “[e]ncroaching trees and plants may be regarded as a 
nuisance when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent danger of actual 
harm to adjoining property . . . .”229  Under the Hawaii approach, a successful 
suit must show that a neighbor’s tree encroaching onto his land “cause[s] actual 
harm or . . . the imminent danger of actual harm . . . .”230  Comparatively, a 
successful negligence claim involves showing four elements: (1) the defendant 
owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) the defendant failed to act on that duty; (3) the 
plaintiff suffered a harm (damages); and (4) the failure to act on the duty was 
the proximate and “but-for” cause of the harm the plaintiff suffered.231  In tree-
related negligence suits, the crux of the case will be whether the owner of a tree 
was under a duty not to injure the plaintiff.232 
In February 2010, Dr. Cline filed suit in the Circuit Court for Albemarle 
County seeking recovery against several defendants believed to own the land 
from which the tree responsible for his injuries fell.233  The premise of Dr. 
Cline’s suit was that an owner of property adjacent to a public highway owes a 
duty to care for, inspect, maintain, and/or service a tree abutting the public 
highway.234  All of the defendants demurred, and at an oral hearing in August 
2010, Dr. Cline sought a nonsuit as to three of the defendants, leaving Dunlora 
                                                 
 224. Bidwell, supra note 223, at 1036 (citing Smith v. Holt, 5 S.E.2d 492 (Va. 1939) overruled 
by Fancher v. Fagella, 650 S.E.2d 519 (Va. 2007)). 
 225. Smith, 5 S.E.2d at 495 overruled by Fancher, 650 S.E.2d at 519. 
 226. Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 19 (Va. 2012) (Lemons, J., dissenting).  
 227. Fancher, 650 S.E.2d at 521.  “The ‘Virginia Rule,’ holds that the intrusion of roots and 
branches from a neighbor’s plantings which were ‘not noxious in [their] nature’ and had caused ‘no 
sensible injury’ were not actionable at law, the plaintiff being limited to his right of self-help.”  Id. 
(brackets in original). 
 228. Id. at  522.  “The ‘Hawaii Rule,’ holds that living trees and plants are ordinarily not 
nuisances, but can become so when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent danger of actual 
harm to adjoining property.”  Id. at  521. 
 229. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 17 (quoting Francher, 650 S.E.2d at 552). 
 230. Id. at  19 (Lemons, J., dissenting). 
 231. Bidwell, supra note 223, at 1038. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15. 
 234. Id. 
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as the sole defendant.235  In November 2010, Dr. Cline filed an amended 
complaint against Dunlora for the injuries he sustained, asserting that according 
to Fancher v. Fagella, and other Virginia case law, Dunlora had a duty to use 
reasonable care in the inspection, maintenance, and/or service of trees and other 
vegetation on their property, and to remove or make safe such trees, which 
presented a hazard to passersby.236  Dr. Cline further asserted that Dunlora’s 
ownership and maintenance of the property and the “dying, dead, and/or rotten 
tree” was a danger to passersby and constituted a nuisance.237  Although theories 
of public nuisance238 in Virginia protected against this type of obstruction,239  
Dr. Cline’s nuisance claim did not receive as much attention as his  negligence 
claim.240  Dunlora filed another demurrer, which the Circuit Court of Albemarle 
County sustained without leave to amend, holding that Virginia law does not 
provide any authority for an award of personal injury damages caused by a tree 
                                                 
 235. Id.; Opening Brief of Appellant at 4, Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14 (No. 110650). 
 236. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15–16; Opening Brief of Appellant at 2, 5, Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14 (No. 
110650) (“ [T]raditional Virginia tort law, as well as the trend in other jurisdictions and secondary 
authorities, dictate[s] that a landowner has a duty to act reasonably to prevent its trees from injuring 
those for whom injury is reasonably foreseeable.”). 
 237. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15–16.  The Virginia Supreme Court identified in footnote 1 of its 
opinion, “ [Dr.] Cline’s nuisance claim is based upon Dunlora’s alleged conduct” and if Dunlora’s 
conduct was not negligent, the nuisance claim correspondingly fails.  Id. at  16 n.1.  See also DOBBS, 
supra note 163, at § 400 (“So far as a supposed nuisance rests upon proof of the defendant ’s 
negligence, the case proceeds largely as would any other negligence case, and the nuisance label 
adds lit t le or nothing to the analysis.”). 
 238. A public nuisance is “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general 
public.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 821B (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see also Warren A. 
Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L. REV. 984, 984–85 
(1952) (“Conduct which interferes solely with the use of a relatively small area of private land . . . 
is called a private nuisance.  Conduct which interferes with the use of a public place or with the 
activities of an entire community is called a public nuisance.”). 
 239. In relation to public streets, “ [a]ny unauthorized obstruction that unnecessarily impedes 
the lawful use of a public street is a public nuisance at common law.”  Breeding ex rel. Breeding v. 
Hensley, 519 S.E.2d 369, 372 (Va. 1999); see also Price v. Travis, 140 S.E. 644, 647 (Va. 1927) 
(“ [T]he essential characteristic of a public nuisance is that the thing imperils the safety of a public 
highway.”).  Professor Prosser considered the obstruction of a public highway the “obvious 
illustration” of a public nuisance.  William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. 
L. REV. 997, 1001–02 (1966). 
 240. Although at the initial stage Dr. Cline pleaded theories of nuisance, see Amended 
Complaint, Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 81 Va. Cir. 235 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2010) (No. CL1000012200), 
2010 WL 9100619, the Circuit Court of Albemarle County sustained Dunlora’s Demurrer, see 
Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, No. CL10000122-00, 2011 WL 9809654 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 4, 2011), 
which stated that Dr. Cline’s “ [a]mended complaint failed to set forth facts sufficient to state a 
cause of action for nuisance.”  Demurrer to Amended Complaint, Cline, 81 Va. Cir. 245 (No. 
CL1000012200).  On review the Virginia Supreme Court considered a narrow question : “does a 
Virginia landowner have a duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent foreseeable personal 
injury caused by its tree that has been visibly dead and decaying for years?”  Opening Brief of 
Appellant at 1, Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14 (No. 110650).  The Virginia Supreme Court did not even 
consider whether nuisance would have been an alternative to negligence and it  is unclear how they 
might have decided on this issue.  See generally Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14. 
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on adjacent land.241  In 2011, Dr. Cline appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Virginia.242 
When Dr. Cline’s case against Dunlora was before the Virginia Supreme 
Court in early 2012, the rule followed by the court was the Hawaii rule, which 
“gave injured plaintiffs access to legal remedies under the theory that trees could 
constitute a nuisance when they caused actual harm or posed the threat of 
imminent harm.”243  Therefore, the question before the Supreme Court of 
Virginia on appeal was whether a private landowner has a reasonable sic utere 
duty to prevent injuries caused by a dead or rotting “tree falling from private 
land onto. . . a public highway.”244 
1. The Majority Opinion 
In a four to three split decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the 
judgment of the Circuit Court of Albemarle County and entered a final judgment 
against Dr. Cline.245  The Court held that a landowner only owes a duty “to 
refrain from engaging in any act that makes the highway more dangerous than 
in a state of nature or in the state in which it has been left.”246  Moreover, the 
Court opined that it had “never recognized, nor did [its] precedents support, a 
ruling that a landowner owes a duty to protect travelers on an adjoining public 
roadway from natural conditions on his or her land.”247 
In considering the question presented, a de novo standard of review was used, 
and the Court accepted as true the factual allegations of Dr. Cline’s complaint, 
his attachments, and the reasonable inferences that followed, but not Dr. Cline’s 
legal conclusions.248  The opinion first examined the history of the duties a 
landowner owed to those outside the land and whether such duty exists.249  
Initially, the discussion considered common law and found that “a landowner 
owed no duty to those outside the land with respect to natural conditions existing 
on the land, regardless of their dangerous condition.”250  Then, the Court looked 
to its decision in Smith v. Holt, and observed how there was never a standard 
fashioned allowing for the application of the “principles of ordinary negligence 
[to] apply to natural conditions on land,” but rather had allowed a nuisance cause 
of action, “if a sensible injury was inflicted by the protrusion of roots from a 
                                                 
 241. Cline, 81 Va. Cir. at 236, aff’d, 726 S.E.2d 14 (Va. 2012); Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, No. 
CL10000122-00, 2011 WL 9809654 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 4, 2011). 
 242. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15; Opening Brief of Appellant at 5, Cline, 726 S.E.2d 14 (No. 
110650). 
 243. Bidwell, supra note 223, at 1036. 
 244. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15. 
 245. See id. at  15, 18. 
 246. Id. at  18. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at  16. 
 249. See id. at  16–17. 
 250. Id. at  16. 
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noxious tree or plant on the property of an adjoining landowner.”251  But, the 
Court also recognized that it had adopted the Hawaii approach in Fancher to 
encroaching vegetation and created a rule allowing relief from a neighbor’s tree 
encroaching onto the land of another as a nuisance, when the encroaching trees 
“cause actual harm or the imminent danger of actual harm.”252 
The Court disagreed with Dr. Cline’s assertion that, logically, the Fancher 
principles create the existence of a duty because this duty “addresses a narrow 
category of actions arising from nuisance caused by the encroachment of 
vegetation onto adjoining . . . lands.”253  And “[t]he duties . . . in Fancher and 
Smith [—i.e., the Hawaii and Virginia Rules—] are dramatically different than 
duties necessary to support an action for personal injury predicated upon a duty 
of a landowner regarding the natural decline of trees on his or her property, 
which is adjacent to a roadway.”254  Moreover, property owners whose land is 
adjacent to a public highway only must “refrain from engaging in any act that 
makes the highway more dangerous than in a state of nature or in the state in 
which it has been left.”255  Short of having taken an action to make the tree more 
dangerous than it was naturally, Dunlora escaped liability.256 
2. The Dissenting Opinion 
Three Justices dissented from the majority’s opinion and argued that the 
principles of ordinary negligence should apply here following sic utere.257  As a 
case of first impression, the dissenters considered the varying approaches to the 
“not entirely unusual situation” of encroaching trees or vegetation.258  Their 
discussion begins with the Restatement’s imposition of liability on landowners 
resulting from trees falling on public highways.259  But, because multiple 
approaches have grown out of the Restatement’s standard, the justices examined 
leading jurisdictions’ approaches to the issue.260 
                                                 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at  17. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at  18. 
 256. The duty owed by Dunlora was “ to refrain from engaging in any act that makes the 
highway more dangerous than in a state of nature or in the state in which it  has been left.”  Id.  Had 
Dunlora taken an action to make the highway more dangerous, its conduct would have breached 
such duty. 
 257. Id. at  18–19 (Lemons, J., dissenting). 
 258. Id. at  19–20. 
 259. See id. at  19 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 840(1) (AM. LAW INST. 
1979)) (“ [A] possessor of land is not liable to persons outside the land for a nuisance resulting 
solely from a natural condition of the land.”). 
 260. Id. at  20.  Further approaches might grow out of the Restatement ’s standards as the 
recently published Restatement (Third) of Torts section 8 concerns public nuisances resulting in 
economic loss.  RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF T ORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 8 (AM. LAW INST. 
2010).  Importantly, however, section 8 “does not seek to restate the substantive law of public 
2018]Re-Evaluating the Demise of the Average, Ordinary, Reasonable Person  729 
Some jurisdictions, for example, have adopted a rule that considers the 
urban/rural distinction and finds no duty to inspect trees in a state of nature in a 
rural area.261  Other jurisdictions blend the division between urban/rural and 
focus on “the size, type, and use of the highway and land to determine the proper 
liability standard — whether this is a duty to inspect.”262  While other 
jurisdictions create a general duty to inspect any trees adjacent to public 
highways.263  Still others impose a duty of reasonable care upon all landowners, 
without any specific duty to inspect trees adjacent to highways.264  Moreover, 
the dissenting justices mentioned that the imposition of liability “require[s] the 
presence of patent visible decay.”265  Ultimately, the dissent calls for a general 
duty of reasonable care suggesting that the court adopt the following rule that a 
“landowner should be liable for injuries resulting from a tree falling from his or 
her property onto a public highway if he or she knows or has reason to know of 
the imminent danger presented by the tree’s death, decay or other visible 
defect.”266 
The rule the dissenting justices promoted “avoid[s] the rigid dichotomies 
expressed in other rules, which have been found unworkable by [other] 
courts,”267 and, holds landowners to the same economic efficiencies 
fundamental to the sic utere doctrine.268  However, the dissent could have gone 
further and decided on a theory of nuisance, which would have more fully 
embraced the economic efficiencies of the sic utere doctrine. 
B. The Doctrine of Waste as a Vector of Force in Decision-Making 
In Cline, the Court would have been wise to apply the macro approach used 
by courts when determining whether an individual committed the tort of 
“waste.”  With roots in the common law maximum of sic utere,269 the common 
                                                 
nuisance 13 except as necessary to explain those cases that produce 14 liability in tort for economic 
loss.”  Id. 
 261. Id.; see also Ford v. S.C. Dep’t  of Transp., 492 S.E.2d 811, 814 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); 
Lemon v. Edwards, 344 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Ky. 1961); Zacharias v. Nesbitt , 185 N.W. 295, 296 
(Minn. 1921). 
 262. Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 19 (Va. 2012) (Lemons, J., dissenting); Lewis 
v. Krussel, 2 P.3d 486, 490–91 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); Taylor v. Olsen, 578 P.2d 779, 782–83 (Or. 
1978). 
 263. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 20 (Lemons, J., dissenting). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at  21. 
 267. Bidwell, supra note 223, at 1056. 
 268. Id. at  1057. 
 269. Smith, supra note 17, at 696 (discussing how the Doctrines of Waste, Public Trust, and 
Nuisance grew out of the sic utere doctrine); see also Smith v. Cap Concrete, Inc., 184 Cal. Rptr. 
308, 311 (Ct. App. 1982) (“Waste evolved and broadened from a cause of action designed to protect 
owners of succeeding estates against the improper conduct of the person in possession which 
harmed and affected the inheritance, to a legal means by which any concurrent non -possessory 
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law doctrine of waste protects those with an absolute claim to an estate from 
injuries caused to that estate by individuals with less than an absolute claim to 
the estate—such as leasehold estates.270  To constitute waste there needs to be 
an act or omission that permanently diminishes or depreciates the value of the 
property.271  There exist three types of waste: voluntary, permissive, and 
meliorating.272  Permissive waste involves negligence or an omission that would 
allow for deterioration to the property.273  Voluntary waste is a “deliberate, 
willful, or voluntary destruction or carrying away of something attached to [the 
property].”274  Meliorating waste is a special type of waste that is seemingly in 
opposition of the theories of permissive and voluntary waste.  Technically 
considered waste, meliorating waste improves the value of the land instead of 
decreasing the value.275  Courts’ refusals to enter judgments of waste when the 
damages are only nominal, and the refusal of courts of equity to enjoin technical 
                                                 
holders of interest in the land are enabled to prevent or restrain harm to the land committed by 
persons in possession.”). 
 270. See 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waste § 1 (2018); Waste—Ameliorating Waste-Effect of Short-Term 
Lease, 31 YALE L.J. 781, 781 (1922) (“Waste is the destruction or material alteration or 
deterioration of the freehold or of the improvements forming a material part thereof, by any person 
rightfully in possession but who has not the fee tit le or the full estate.”); see also Luis v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1092–93 (2016) (“[T]he law of property sometimes allows a person without 
a present interest in a piece of property to impose restrictions upon a current owner . . . to prevent 
waste.”); Rehman v. State Univ. of N.Y., 596 F. Supp. 2d 643, 660 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) ( “ [A]ctions in 
waste are generally relegated to cases where the holder of real property causes a deterioration [to] 
the property.”); Cal. Dep’t  of Toxic Substances Control v. Payless Cleaners, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 
1082 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (defining waste and giving a brief history of the doctrine’s evolution); 
Proffitt  v. Henderson, 29 Mo. 325, 325 (1860) (“Waste is a lasting damage to the reversion caused 
by the destruction, by the tenant for life or years.”).  Waste can also occur to personal property 
when the property has become part of the real property.  Meyer v. Hansen, 373 N.W.2d 392, 395 
(N.D. 1985). 
 271. Waste, supra note 270, at § 1.  Importantly, when a court considers waste, its application 
of the doctrine is flexible and considers factors like the characteristics of the estate and the type of 
property.  Id. § 16. 
 272. See generally id. §§ 5, 7. 
 273. Jowdy v. Guerin, 457 P.2d 745, 748–50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (affirming a lower court’s 
judgment of waste when the evidence—although not showing the actual cause of deterioration—
reflects the possessors’ failure to protect the property in any manner whatever); see also Keesecker 
v. Bird, 490 S.E.2d 754, 770 (W. Va. 1997) (emphasizing that plaintiffs brought a permissive waste 
claim where real property and personal property was not being cared for). 
 274. Waste, supra note 270, at § 5. 
 275. See id. § 7.  In J.H. Bellows Co. v. Covell, the Defendants were developing a golf course 
on leased property attempted to change a “marshy” and “muck[y]” pond into an artificial lake.  162 
N.E. 621, 621 (1927).  The owners of the property threatened to enter upon the leased property to 
prevent the improvement to the pond, and the developers brought suit  against them.  The owners 
of the property brought a counter suit  alleging the improvements were waste and sought an 
injunction.  Id. at  621–22.  The court considered how the improvements to the pond—although 
technically waste—resulted in an improvement to the land.  Id. at  622.  Accordingly, because this 
type of meliorating waste is allowed, the court denied the injunction.  Id. 
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waste where the damages were trivial, has contributed to the theory of 
meliorating waste.276 
Whether an act or omission constitutes waste heavily depends on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular act or omission.277  In considering whether the 
particular facts constitute waste, an appropriate application “must be shaped and 
defined by a balancing of the costs and the benefits of allowing the questioned 
acts to continue.”278  The doctrine of waste “mediates between the competing 
interests” of parties who have different incentives to maximize the value of 
property at different stages in the life of the property.279  Balancing the costs and 
benefits is in the public interest and allows for improvements or alterations to 
the property by the tenant which otherwise under a strict liability standard of 
waste would be considered waste.280  Part of this balancing involves the 
“average, ordinary reasonable person” and how this ideal person would treat his 
own property.281  Here, utilizing the average, ordinary reasonable person, the 
similarity between the doctrines of waste and nuisance is unmistakable.  
Waste—like nuisance—has a tendency to depend on what a community 
considers waste.282  The similarities between the two doctrines suggest the most 
efficient path to achieving a “waste-less” community and protecting the 
underlying goal of the doctrine of waste (i.e., to ensure the property rights of 
those with an absolute claim to property are protected283) is achieved through 
nuisance principles. 
                                                 
 276. Ameliorating Waste, 14 HARV. L. REV. 226, 226 (1900). 
 277. Chosar Corp. v. Owens, 370 S.E.2d 305, 307 (Va. 1988).  Waste, however, is not the 
ordinary wear and tear that occurs over time and with normal use. See generally Waste, supra note 
270, at § 1. 
 278. Smith, supra note 17, at 696 n.262. 
 279. See POSNER, supra, note 14, at 92.  For example, as Posner discusses, a tenant will have 
an incentive to maximize the present value of the earnings stream obtainable durin g his possession 
of the property.  On the other side, the person who will inherit  full ownership to the estate following 
the tenant’s term is concerned with the entire stream of earnings.  Id.  The common law doctrine of 
waste solves these conflicting incentives with its cost benefit  balancing analysis. 
 280. See Ameliorating Waste, supra note 276, at 226. 
 281. Smith, supra note 17, at 696 n.262.  The average, ordinary reasonable person is discussed 
in Section III. of this Article.  As discussed there, the theory of the average ordinary reasonable 
person is not without flaws. 
 282. See Smith, supra note 17, at 696 n.262 (“The subject or focus of waste, then, as seen, is 
fluid and will vary from community to community and with customs and usages within each.”). 
 283. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Doctrine of Waste in Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC: Validating 
Principles 
The Court in Cline did not contemplate the doctrine of waste, and for good 
cause,284 but some properties of the doctrine are floating around in the dissent.285  
Inherent in the Court’s discussion of the damages caused by the tree falling on 
Dr. Cline’s vehicle is the principles of waste—diminishment or depreciation of 
the value of the property caused by another person’s acts or omissions.  The 
dissent in Cline argued for an application of negligence following the doctrine 
of sic utere, which, as explained above, is part of the foundation of waste.286  
The dissent argues explicitly for a general duty of reasonable care; a reoccurring 
theme in the doctrine of waste.287  Were facts of Cline different and were the 
doctrine of waste to apply, Dunlora’s actions would be an example of waste.  
Dunlora did not care for the tree, it became dangerous, and caused damage to 
property.288 
The theory to which the dissent in Cline eludes validates the principles of the 
tort of waste.  The dissent would hold liable a landowner who did not remedy a 
dead, decaying, or otherwise visibly defective tree.289  This rule would 
incorporate the economic considerations fundamental to the doctrine of waste.  
Waste is about the balance between the present tenant’s rights versus the 
absolute owner’s rights.290  That balance is best achieved with a cost based 
consideration.  The tenant is in the best position to ensure the property’s value 
is not harmed.  However, as seen with courts of equity and meliorating waste, a 
court will not find a tenant liable strictly because the elements of waste exists; 
there must be some harm to the absolute owner’s interest.  This is the 
fundamental cost benefit balancing judges are asked to do with the doctrine of 
waste and shows how the doctrine solves the issue at the macro level.  Similarly,  
in Cline the court could have used a similar macro approach to help guide them 
in their decision. 
                                                 
 284. Waste is a tort concerning damages to real property or personal property that is a part of 
the real property, similar to fixtures, caused by a person with less than full rights to the property.  
See Waste, supra note 270, at § 1.  In Cline, someone in less than full possession of the property 
did not cause the damages to Dr. Cline and his vehicle.  Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 
15 (Va. 2012).  Rather, the damage was caused by the defendant ’s property; the doctrine of waste 
would not apply.  See id. 
 285. See generally id. at  18–21 (Lemons, J., dissenting). 
 286. See id. at  20.  See also supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
 287. See Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 20–21 (Lemons, J., dissenting) (quoting Gibson v. Hunsberger,  
428 S.E.2d 489, 492 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)).  See also supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 288. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 15.  This would be similar to Keesecker v. Bird, where the appellees 
allowed an injury to the property through their inaction.  490 S.E.2d 754, 769 (W. Va. 1997). 
 289. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 21 (Lemons, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).  
 290. See supra notes 269–270 and accompanying text. 
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2. Pleading Nuisance in the Alternative 
The dissent from Cline and Dr. Cline’s amended complaint hint at a practical 
alternative for tree-related cases.291  Instead of relying entirely on a negligence 
theory of liability—a theory, which as described earlier is deeply flawed292—
plaintiffs might be wise to also plead a nuisance claim in the alternative.293  
Although the lines between nuisance and negligence have gradually blurred over 
time,294 it would not be unprecedented to bring these claims together, and “there 
is no persuasive or compelling reason why a plaintiff should not be able to allege 
both negligence and nuisance.”295  Pleading nuisance in the alternative would 
serve as a useful backstop for instances where a court might not find all of the 
elements of a negligence claim satisfied. 
Still, plaintiffs cannot rely only on pleading nuisance in the alternative.  As 
witnessed in Cline and as discussed in Dobbs’ Law of Torts, if a nuisance action 
succeeds or fails upon the defendant’s negligence, the case would depend on the 
negligence elements being satisfied.296  What Cline illustrates, then, is that to 
plead successfully nuisance in the alternative, the defendant’s negligence cannot 
be the central issue.297  Rather, had Dr. Cline more clearly pleaded negligence 
                                                 
 291. Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 21 (Lemons, J., dissenting); Amended Complaint, Cline v. Dunlora 
S., LLC, 81 Va. Cir. 235 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2010) (No. CL1000012200), 2010 WL 9100619.  However, 
Dr. Cline needed to have pleaded nuisance more successfully so as to  bring the question before the 
courts. 
 292. For example, in Cline the court struggled with whether Dunlora owed a duty to ensure the 
tree did not cause injury or whether Dunlora only owed a duty not to make the tree more dangerous 
than it  was naturally.  Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 18.  See also Smith & Fernandez, supra note 206. 
 293. See Lewis v. Krussel, 2 P.3d 486, 489 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); see also James T .R. Jones, 
Trains, Trucks, Trees and Shrubs: Vision-Blocking Natural Vegetation and a Landowner’s Duty to 
Those Off the Premises, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1263, 1266 n.16 (1994) (“Counsel for injured travelers 
always should consider whether asserting a nuisance claim (or claims) in addition to an ordinary 
negligence claim might prove beneficial.”). 
 294. Howard L. Oleck, Nuisance in a Nutshell, 5 CLEV. MARSHALL L. REV. 148, 149 (1956).  
See also, William M. Cromer, Absolute and Qualified Nuisance in Ohio , 9 OHIO ST. L.J., 164, 164–
65 (1948).  For example, in McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, Justice Cardozo discussed that the 
nuisance in the case grew out of the defendant ’s negligence.  160 N.E. 391, 391 (N.Y. 1928).  Still, 
“ [n]egligence and nuisance . . . are not always mutually exclusive legal concepts.”  Jost v. Dairyland 
Power Co-op., 172 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Wis. 1969). 
 295. PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., VIRGINIA PRACTICE SERIES: T ORT AND PERSONAL INJURY 
LAW § 8.1 (West rev. ed. 2015); accord W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF T ORTS § 87, p. 622 (5th ed. 1984) (“The existence of a nuisance to the land does not of 
course preclude an independent tort action for ordinary negligence resulting in interference with 
the bodily security of the individual.”).  See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Blue Springs, 904 S.W.2d 322, 
328 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (plaintiffs filed suit  against defendants under two theories: maintaining a 
public nuisance and negligence). 
 296. DOBBS, supra note 163, at § 400; accord Cline, 726 S.E.2d at 18.  See also Breeding ex 
rel. Breeding v. Hensley, 519 S.E.2d 369, 373 (Va. 1999) (“ [A] Town is liable for maintaining a 
public nuisance only if the plaintiffs can establish the Town employees were negligent.”). 
 297. See DOBBS, supra note 163, at § 400; Wells v. Whitaker, 151 S.E.2d 422, 434 (Va. 1966) 
(discussing circumstances where it  is not necessary to allege or prove negligence).  
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and nuisance as two distinct causes of action instead of allowing the Court to 
blend them together, his nuisance claim could have proceeded even though his 
negligence claim failed.  This type of pleading would allow the courts to be more 
efficient when allocating the costs of injury. 
CONCLUSION 
The calculus of causation for establishing negligence has become a paradox 
to the ideal of corrective justice and the need for the efficient and expeditious 
administration of justice.298  As seen, there are both latent and patent ambiguities  
in theory and in application of the tort of negligence.299  The prolonged demise 
of the pivotal “cast member” in the causation saga is the average, ordinary, 
reasonable person.  Accordingly, when an action is followed which a reasonable 
person would not follow, or when action is—contrariwise—not undertaken that 
a reasonable person would pursue, negligence results.300 
Today, the very notion of a citizenry composed of average, ordinary 
reasonable persons strains the limits of credulity as statistics show the already 
high rates of illiteracy and cognitive impairment growing.301  The consequence 
of this growth means, simply, that more and more “aggrieved” parties will be 
litigating what they perceive are civil wrongs based on unreasonable conduct.  
The level of judicial scrutiny of every day transactions in the marketplace should 
be tempered by the status of the parties and, more specifically, a determination 
of whether one or more of the party litigants is impaired cognitively.  This 
condition to exist should, at a minimum, be accepted as a mitigating factor for 
the courts to consider when ruling on the merits of an actionable claim, or 
alternatively, reforming a contract in dispute. 
A new emphasis on objective standards of conduct—rather than normative 
standards which are used traditionally in testing the conduct of the average, 
ordinary, reasonable persons vis-à-vis causation for the torts of negligence to be 
established—is a recognition of the high rate of illiteracy in America302 and an 
effort to allow more opportunities for corrective justice.  Accepting the notion 
that, at the center, every legal case resolves around the need to test the 
reasonableness of conduct by the parties,303 leads—then—to the conclusion that 
                                                 
 298. See MORAN, supra note 4, at 3–4; Rodgers, supra note 5, at 9–11. 
 299. See Gardner, supra note 25, at 31–32; Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 324–25; 
Zipursky, supra note 15, at 2132 (discussing ambiguities of the reasonable person standard).  
 300. See Miller & Perry, supra note 151, at 325. 
 301. See supra notes 16, 61–65, 84 and accompanying text; see generally Cupp, supra note 64 
(discussing whether granting legal personhood to animals based on cognitive abilit ies would 
endanger the rights of individuals with severe cognitive impairments).  
 302. See supra notes 16, 61–65, 84 and accompanying text. 
 303. See POSNER, supra note 143, at 272.  (“ [I]t  sets no higher aspiration for the judge than 
that his decisions be reasonable in the light of the warring interests in the cases, although a reason 
able decision is not necessarily a ‘right’ one.”). 
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defining reasonableness is of paramount concern in attempting to reach a level 
of corrective justice. 
The question then becomes the extent to which the legal system is willing to 
maintain this doctrine on “life support” and thereby “accommodate[] 
imprecision”304 rather than go with a more efficient pathway toward achieving 
efficiency in decision making by using—generically—the standard for 
determining reasonable conduct as set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
for establishing liability for nuisance.305  This proposed shift in thinking, policy, 
and practice would go far to resolve the ongoing cri de coeur—or outcry—
raging over the extended use of the multi-purpose tort of negligence as the 
remedial panacea for nearly all civil wrongs. 
The harmonious balancing of interests that Cardozo opined was the only hope 
for progress in the law,306 is best achieved by adopting the balancing test set out 
for determining the reasonableness of conduct under the Restatement.307  The 
courts should test parties in litigation, in order to determine which of them acted 
more rationally or soundly from an economic standpoint.308  Courts might ask 
how their rulings could best achieve economic (or corrective) justice.  
Secondarily, courts could ask whose interests are best served individually, from 
micro economic analysis or collectively, from a macro or societal point of view.  
Since the “spirit of the times” is a capitalistic society rooted in “economic 
efficiency,”309 the courts should—then—strive for resolutions that make “the 
most sense [and are] both efficient and fair.”310 
The “simple language,”311 or lingua franca, that Camus sought in everyday 
discourse, will never for the law, be attainable.  Yet, by lessening the “death 
grip” on the notion of an average, ordinary, reasonable person so necessary in 
proving causation for negligence, and utilizing, instead, objective cost/benefit 
factors for determining the reasonableness of conduct, progress will have been 








                                                 
 304. Rodgers, supra note 5, at 34. 
 305. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 306. CARDOZO, supra note 147, at 114, 115 n.25. 
 307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS §§ 822, 827–28 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 308. POSNER, supra note 14, at 3. 
 309. Id. at  342.  See Elliot, supra note 41, at 62–63. 
 310. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 196, at 64. 
 311. Zaretsky, supra note 1. 
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